Discretion and its effects: Analyzing the experiences of street-level bureaucrats during policy implementation by Tummers, L.G. (Lars) & Bekkers, V.J.J.M. (Victor)
  
 
 
 
 
Discretion and its effects: Analyzing the experiences of street-level 
bureaucrats during policy implementation 
 
 
EGPA Conference 
Bergen, Norway, 5-8 September 2012 
PSG XIII: On Public Policy 
Chairs: Harald Sætren and Peter Hupe 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Lars Tummers and Victor Bekkers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
Dept. of Public Administration     
Erasmus University Rotterdam     
P.O. Box 1738        
NL-3000 DR Rotterdam      
Tummers@fsw.eur.nl, Bekkers@fsw.eur.nl, 
  
  2 
Abstract 
Street-level bureaucrats implementing public policies have a certain degree of freedom – or discretion 
– in their work. Following the work of Lipsky, the concept of discretion has received wide attention in 
the policy implementation literature.  However, scholars have not yet developed theoretical 
frameworks regarding the effects of discretion, which were subsequently tested these using large n 
samples. In this study, we develop a theoretical framework regarding two effects of discretion (client 
meaningfulness and willingness to implement), in order to increase our understanding of the 
mechanisms at work. The hypothesized relationships are tested using a Dutch nationwide survey 
among 1.317 psychologists, psychiatrists and psychotherapists implementing a new reimbursement 
policy. These are analysed using Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and Structural Equation 
Modelling (SEM). The results firstly show a positive effect of discretion on client meaningfulness. Next 
to this, discretion positively affected the willingness to implement a policy, and this is partially mediated 
by client meaningfulness. Hence, when street-level bureaucrats experience discretion, this positively 
influences the value they can deliver to clients, which in turn positively influences their willingness to 
implement a policy. Implications for policy implementation researchers are discussed. 
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DISCRETION AND ITS EFFECTS: ANALYZING THE EXPERIENCES OF STREET-LEVEL 
BUREAUCRATS DURING POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
 
1 Introduction 
In his book ‘Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public services’, Michael Lipsky 
(1980) analysed the behaviour of front-line staff in policy delivery agencies. Lipsky refers to these 
frontline workers “street-level bureaucrats”. These are public employees who “interact directly with 
citizens in the course of their jobs, and have substantial discretion in the execution of their work” 
(1980:3). Examples are teachers, police officers, and judges. These street-level bureaucrats 
implement public policies. However, there are intrinsic problems when implementing public policies: 
street-level bureaucrats have to respond to citizens with only a limited amount of information or only a 
limited amount of time to make a decision. Moreover, very often the rules to implement does not 
always correspond to the specific situation or context of the involved citizen.  In response, street 
bureaucrats develop coping mechanisms. They simplify the nature of their job or develop routines so 
that they feel they are doing their job well in some way. This is possible as they have a certain degree 
of discretion – or autonomy - in their work (1980:14). Following the work of Lipsky, the concept of 
discretion has received wide attention in the policy implementation literature.  Special attention in the 
literature is related to the appreciation of discretion in terms of its significance for the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of public policies.   
However, although there has been substantial research on the issue of discretion, to 
understand the nature of discretion, scholars have not yet developed theoretical frameworks regarding 
the effects of discretion, which were subsequently tested these using large n samples (see also 
O'Toole, 2000). This is in line with arguments of Winter (2003:221) who notes that “there is a need for 
more theory development and testing [in policy implementation research], and the development of 
partial theories seems more promising than continuing the search for the general implementation 
theory or model”. In this study, we aim to develop a theoretical framework regarding the effects of 
discretion, in order to increase our understanding of the mechanisms at work. More it can be noticed 
that there also seems to be bias in the discretion literature, because much of the of the empirical 
research on police, social service workers, health and safety inspectors, building inspectors and other 
frontline workers (Meyers & Vorsanger, 2003). Saetren (2005) shows that - in general - there is a lot of 
research concerning policy implementation in the healthcare sector. However, it seems that policy 
implementation scholars have paid not much attention to the role of medical professionals in front line 
jobs, such as physicians, nurses or psychologists, working in the (semi)public sector.  
One important effect, which is often noted, is that a certain amount of discretion can make it 
possible to adjust the (general) policy to the specific circumstances and needs of the client (Palumbo 
et al., 1984). For instance, a social worker can adjust the policy to fit the specific needs of the 
particular unemployed person he is working with. Hence, it is argued that, when street-level 
bureaucrats have a certain degree of discretion, this will enhance will make the policy more 
meaningful for the client. Client meaningfulness can thus be considered a potential effect of discretion. 
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Furthermore, some authors note that, when street-level bureaucrats are given a certain 
amount of freedom in decision making process regarding how to implement specific policies, this will 
make them more willing to implement a specific policy program. Tummers (2011) showed this while 
studying 'policy alienation', a new concept for understanding the identification problems of street-level 
bureaucrats with new policies (see also Tummers et al., 2009). One mechanism underlying this 
relationship between discretion and willingness to implement seems to be that a certain amount of 
discretion increases the meaningfulness for clients, which in turn enhances their willingness to 
implement this policy (Hill & Hupe, 2009; Lipsky, 1980). Hence, the variable ‘client meaningfulness’ 
could mediate the relationship between discretion and willingness to implement. This is often 
(implicitly) argued, but this particular mechanism have not yet been studied empirically. Hence, our 
central research question is: How and why does discretion influence the willingness of street level 
bureaucrats to implement specific policy programs and what role does client meaningfulness play in it?  
 In this article, we develop and test a model regarding the effects of discretion. After developing 
the theoretical framework, the hypothesized relationships are tested using a quantitative approach, 
employing data of a Dutch nationwide survey among 1.300 psychologists, psychiatrists and 
psychotherapists implementing a new reimbursement policy. Structural Equation Modeling is used for 
testing this framework. Next to its theoretical value (developing a model to study the effects of 
discretion), a second value of this study lies therefore in its quantitative approach. To date, most policy 
implementation studies have had a rather qualitative nature. The qualitative  studies have substantial 
value, for instance in providing a deep understanding on how and why street-level bureaucrats provide 
public services. Quantitative research can help in theory testing and statistical generalization. Although 
some valuable quantitative research has been taken place (Brodkin & Majmundar, 2010; May & 
Winter, 2009; Riccucci, 2005b), O’Toole (2000:269) notes that “the move to multivariate explanation 
and large numbers of cases exposes the [policy implementation] specialty to new or renewed 
challenges, which have yet to be addressed fully.” (see also Hill & Hupe, 2009; Winter, 2007). We 
used Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), followed by Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). These 
techniques fit the research problem at hand and can be considered very novel for policy 
implementation literature (see also Section 3) 
This brings us to the outline of this article. We will firstly develop a theoretical framework 
(Section 2), which outlines the relationships between discretion, client meaningfulness, and willingness 
to implement. From the theoretical framework, we will develop a number of hypotheses. Section 3 
describes the operationalization of the concepts and the design of the research project. Following this, 
the results section shows some descriptive statistics and discusses the analyses which test the 
hypotheses. We conclude by discussing the contribution of this article to policy implementation 
literature, with a particular emphasis on discretion of street-level bureaucrats. 
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2 Theoretical framework 
2.1 Background on discretion 
The concept of discretion has been used in various ways. Some authors focus on the discretion given 
to states – for instance to implement EU legislation - or to agencies implementing governmental rules 
(Oosterwaal et al., 2011; Thomson et al., 2007). In this study, we will focus on the discretion during 
implementing particular policies and discuss its effects on client meaningfulness and willingness to 
implement public policies. We must note that, given the abundance of literature and the intrinsic 
difficulties with the discretion concept (such as the different interpretations attached to as well as 
criticisms of these interpretations), we cannot provide a full analysis of the term discretion in this 
article. Readers interested in an elaborate account on street-level bureaucracy and discretion can 
refer to a number of important books and book chapters which focus on this subject (Davis, 1969; 
Evans, 2010; Hill & Hupe, 2009; Lipsky, 1980; Meyers & Vorsanger, 2003; Winter, 2007).   
 In his book “Professional discretion in welfare services”, Evans (2010) notes that for workers, 
discretion can be seen as the extent of freedom he or she can exercise in a specific context. Related 
to this, Davis (1969:4) notes that ‘a public officer has discretion whenever the effective limits on his 
power leave him free to make a choice among possible courses of action or inaction’. In a similar vein, 
Vinzant and Crothers (1998:37) define discretion as “the power of free decision or latitude of choice 
within certain legal bounds” (Davis, 1969)(Davis, 1969)(Davis, 1969). Lipsky (1980) focuses more 
specifically on the street-level bureaucrats, which implement policies and interact with clients while 
doing this. He views discretion as the freedom which street-level bureaucrats have in determining the 
sort, quantity and quality of sanctions and rewards during policy implementation (see also Hill & Hupe, 
2009; Tummers, 2012). Following this, we view discretion as the freedom of street-level bureaucrats in 
making choices concerning the sort, quantity, and quality of sanctions and rewards on offer when 
implementing a policy. For instance, to which extent can policemen themselves decide whether to give 
an on-the-spot fine? To which extent can teachers decide what and how to teach students about the 
development of mankind, for instance on evolution or creationism (Berkman & Plutzer, 2010)? 
 When discussing the notion of discretion, it is important to note the discussion between the 
top-down and bottom-up perspectives on policy implementation. In the 1970s and 1980s, there was an 
intense debate on the correct understanding of the phenomenon of policy implementation (Rist, 1995) 
by leading authors such as Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) and Van Meter and Van Horn (1975). The 
early implementation scholars were particularly concerned with the relationship between policy 
formation and policy implementation. This led to a debate between the ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ 
perspectives on policy implementation (DeLeon & DeLeon, 2002; Hill & Hupe, 2009). Based on these 
insights, more nuanced approaches were developed (for example Goggin et al., 1990; Sabatier & 
Jenkins-Smith, 1993), although the distinction between top-down and bottom-up approaches remains 
important (Hill & Hupe, 2009). 
 Top-down perspectives (Hogwood & Gunn, 1984; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984; Sabatier & 
Mazmanien, 1979) view the implementation of policy as basically a mechanistic process which is 
completely isolated from policy formation. Implementation is a rational process that can be pre-
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planned and controlled by the policy formulators. The requirements of implementation are presented 
as a generalized list of conditions, which if met, will enable effective implementation. Bottom-up 
perspectives (Barrett & Fudge, 1981; Elmore, 1985; Hanf, 1982; Hjern & Hull, 1982; Lipsky, 1980), on 
the other hand, see policy implementation in a much more dynamic and interactive process. In their 
view, policy formulation and policy implementation are not strictly separated. Further, they note that 
control over people is not the way forward to effective implementation. Instead of regarding human 
beings as chains in line of command – or cogs in a machine - policy formulators should realize that 
policy is best implemented by what Elmore (1985) termed “backward mapping” of policies, which 
involves defining success in human or behavioral terms and not in the completion of a “policy 
hypothesis”. 
 In both top-down and bottom-up approaches, the notion of discretion is important. Both 
discuss the notion of discretion, and often formulate normative beliefs. According to top-down 
scholars, discretion is often not welcomed (Davis, 1969; Polsky, 1993). First, too much discretion 
might result in not reaching the goals set by the “policy hypothesis”. Street-level bureaucrats can 
pursue their own, private goals, and might be shirking the policy or even sabotaging it (Brehm & 
Gates, 1999). The way forward is then to control street-level bureaucrats. Second, street-level 
bureaucrats are not elected officials, and the democratic legitimacy of them taking independent, own 
decisions is therefore questionable (Lowi, 1993), although it must be noted that other scholars argue 
that delegating discretion to street-level bureaucrats is not inconsistent with democratic legitimacy 
(Berkman & Plutzer, 2010; Dahl, 1989).  
 On the other hand, bottom-up scholars often emphasize other characteristics and effects of 
granting street-level bureaucrats discretion. First, they state that discretion is inevitable (Maynard-
Moody & Musheno, 2000). Street-level bureaucrats are faced with limited resources (time, money). In 
these situations, street-level bureaucrats cannot possibly enforce all rules and hence need discretion. 
For instance, police officers cannot arrest everyone they see who make infractions (Lipsky, 1980). 
Using their discretion, they prioritize which infractions are most serious at the given situation. Next to 
being the notion that some discretion is inevitable, more discretion can have positive effects. It might 
increase the client meaningfulness, that is, the value of the policy for clients. Many situations street-
level bureaucrats face are too complicated to be reduced to programmatic formats. In these 
circumstance, discretion makes it possible to adapt the policy to the local needs of the citizens/clients, 
which increases the meaningfulness of the policy for clients (Meyers & Vorsanger, 2003). Further, it 
seems that discretion could positively affect the street-level bureaucrats’ willingness to implement the 
policy. In the policy implementation literature, it is suggested that an important factor in the attitudes of 
street-level public servants is the extent to which organizations delegate decision-making authority to 
the frontline (Meier & O'Toole, 2002). This influence may be particularly pronounced in professionals 
whose expectations of discretion and autonomy contradict notions of bureaucratic control (DeHart-
Davis & Pandey, 2005). 
 Concluding, it seems that discretion can have both positive and negative effects.  In his article, 
we specifically examine two possible positive effects of discretion: enhanced client meaningfulness for 
clients and more willingness to implement the policy. These effects are chosen given their dominant 
  7 
role in the policy implementation debate (Ewalt & Jennings, 2004; Riccucci, 2005a; Simon, 1987; 
Tummers et al., forthcoming 2012). Furthermore, focusing on (merely) two effect enables us to study 
the relationship with discretion more in detail. 
2.2 The effects on discretion on client meaningfulness and willingness to implement 
We will now analyse the relationships between discretion, client meaningfulness and willingness to 
implement. Given the arguments stated previously, we firstly expect that when street-level bureaucrats 
experience high discretion, this positively influences their perception of client meaningfulness. They 
will have the feeling that their freedom in making choices makes it possible to adapt the policy to the 
specific situation of their clients, which increases the value of the policy for clients. For instance, a 
social worker can use her discretion to adapt to the specific wishes and circumstances of the client, 
which enables her to help the client better, which will ultimately enhances the meaningfulness of the 
policy. Client meaningfulness is closely related to the ‘social work narrative’ as this is experienced by 
frontline workers, who focus on helping clients achieve long-term success (Maynard-Moody & 
Musheno, 2003). This amounts to the following first hypothesis: 
 
H1: When street-level bureaucrats experience more discretion, this positively influences their 
experienced client meaningfulness of the policy 
 
Next, we expect that when street-level bureaucrats feel that they do not have enough discretion, this 
negatively influences their willingness to implement a policy, as has been discussed (see also Meyers 
& Vorsanger, 2003; Tummers, 2011). Related to this, in the change management literature it is noted 
that more autonomy of employees reduces their resistance to implement a change (Eilam & Shamir, 
2005; Piderit, 2000).  
 Furthermore, we expect that, when street-level bureaucrats experience more discretion, this 
positively influences their client meaningfulness (H1), which in turn positively influences their 
willingness to implement a policy. Hence, client meaningfulness could influence the willingness to 
implement a policy. This is expected as street-level bureaucrats want to make a difference to their 
clients’ lives when implementing a policy (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000). May and Winter (2009) 
found that if frontline workers perceive the instruments they have at their disposal for implementing a 
policy as ineffective, in terms of delivering to their clients, this is likely to add to their frustrations. They 
do not see how their implementation of the policy helps their clients, and so wonder why they should 
implement it. Given that the evaluation of effectiveness is likely to be based on on-the-job experience, 
rooted in the circumstances that professionals encounter in doing their job, this aspect of attitude is 
likely to be particularly important when it comes to determining attitudes and behaviours (Meyers & 
Vorsanger, 2003). 
 In more technical terms, we expect a mediation effect to occur. A mediation effect is an effect 
of an independent variable (here: discretion) on a dependent variable (willingness to implement) via a 
mediator variable (client meaningfulness)()(). Hence, next to hypothesizing the direct effect of 
discretion on willingness to implement, we expect that a part of this effect is caused by more client 
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meaningfulness. This means that we expect a partially mediated effect: part of the effect of discretion 
on willingness to implement is mediated by client meaningfulness (Baron & Kenny, 1986). We do not 
expect full mediation. Some of the influence of discretion on willingness to implement is explained by 
other factors than increasing client meaningfulness, for instance the intrinsic need for autonomy of 
people in their work (Freidson, 2001; Wagner III, 1994). This brings us to the following hypotheses: 
 
H2: The positive influence of discretion on willingness to implement is partially mediated by the level of 
client meaningfulness 
 
H3: When street-level bureaucrats experience more discretion, this positively and directly influences 
their willingness to implement the policy 
 
This brings us to the following model. In the following sections, we discuss the methods and results for 
testing this model. 
 
Figure 1 Proposed theoretical model 
Client 
meaningfulness
Discretion
Willingness to 
implement
 +  + 
 + 
 
 
3 Methods 
3.1 Case 
To test the proposed model, we undertook a survey of Dutch mental healthcare professionals 
implementing a new reimbursement policy. First, we provide a short overview of this policy. In January 
2008, the Dutch government introduced Diagnoses Related Groups in mental healthcare. This was 
part of a process to convert the Dutch healthcare system into one based on a regulated market. The 
system of Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs, in Dutch Diagnose Behandeling Combinaties, or DBC’s) 
was developed as a means of determining the level of financial exchange for mental healthcare 
provision. The DRG-policy differs significantly from the former method, in which each medical action 
resulted in a financial claim. This meant that, the more sessions that a professional caregiver (a 
psychologist, psychiatrist or psychotherapist) had with a patient, the more recompense that could be 
claimed. This former system was considered by some to be inefficient (Kimberly et al., 2009). The 
DRG-policy changed the situation by stipulating a standard rate for each disorder. The new Law 
Health Market Organization and the associated DRGs can be seen as the introduction of regulated 
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competition into Dutch healthcare, a move in line with New Public Management (NPM) ideas. More 
specifically, it can be seen as a shift to greater competition and more efficient resource use (Hood, 
1991:5). 
We chose the DRG policy as the discretion of the street-level bureaucrats for implementing this 
policy was highly debated. Professionals have to work in a more ‘evidence-based’ way, and are 
required to account for their cost declarations in terms of the mental health DSM (Diagnostic Statistical 
Manual) classification system. As a result, it becomes harder to use practices that are difficult to 
standardize and evaluate, such as psychodynamic treatments. Discretion regarding the length of 
treatment is arguably also increasingly limited. Whereas, in the former system, each medical action 
resulted in a payment, under the DRG policy a standard rate is determined for each disorder. This 
means that it has become more difficult to adjust the treatment to the specific needs of a patient. It is 
interesting to study to how much discretion street-level bureaucrats really experienced, and which 
effects this has. 
As can be seen from the previous paragraph, we focus on experienced discretion. This is based 
on the notion of Lewin (1936): that people behave on the basis of their perceptions of reality, not on 
the basis of reality itself (See also Thomas theorem, Merton, 1995). Street-level bureaucrats may 
experience different levels of discretion, for instance because some have more knowledge on 
(loopholes) in the rules, the way the policy is operationalized in the specific organization and 
personality of the street-level bureaucrat (Brehm & Hamilton, 1996; Lipsky, 1984; Prottas, 1979). 
Hence, also for the same policy, some street-level bureaucrats will perceive more discretion than 
others. In line with this, in the open answers of the survey, we saw that some professionals felt that 
they had substantial discretion, while others felt very limited in their discretion (see also Van Sambeek 
et al., 2011). Illustrating quotes from different respondents are:  
 
 “The DRG-policy does not force me into a certain choices. I examine the funding scheme of 
 the treatment only ‘in second instance’” 
 
 “I do my work first and foremost according to professional standards and hereafter just attach 
 a DRG-label which I think fits but best.” 
 
 “With the DRG-policy, I am being forced into a straitjacket.” 
 
 “You are bound by the rules. so that's a harness.” 
 
In our quantitative results, these differences were also evident, as on a 1-5 scales the scores indeed  
ranged from 1-5, with a standard deviation of .90 (see results). 
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3.2 Sampling and response 
We used a sample of 5,199 mental healthcare professionals implementing the DRG-policy, randomly 
selected from the databases of two nationwide mental healthcare associations. Using an email and 
two reminders, we received 1,317 returns of our questionnaire; a response of 25%.  
Of the valid respondents, 36% were men and 64% women. This balance is consistent with 
Dutch averages for mental health care professionals, where one can find figures as high as 69% of the 
workforce being women (Palm et al., 2008). The respondents’ ages ranged from 23 to 91 years (M = 
48), which is a slightly older average than the Dutch national average for mental healthcare 
professionals (M = 44). Hence, the respondents mean age and gender-distribution are quite similar to 
those of the overall mental healthcare sector. To rule-out a possible non-response bias, we conducted 
non-response research where we contacted the non-responders for their reasons for not participating. 
Common reasons for not participating were a lack of time, retirement, change of occupation or not 
working with the DRG policy (some organizations, including some hospitals, were not yet working with 
this policy). 
The large number of respondents, their characteristics in terms of gender and age and the 
results of the non-response research indicate that our respondents are quite a good representation of 
the population. Nevertheless, we cannot completely rule out a non-response bias since the non-
respondents may differ from the respondents in terms of numerous other (unexamined) 
characteristics. 
3.3 Measures 
This section report the measurement of the variables. Unless stated otherwise, the measures were 
formatted using five-point Likert scales, ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. For the items 
tapping discretion, client meaningfulness and willingness to implement, we used templates. Templates 
allow the researcher to specify an item by replacing general phrases with more specific ones that 
better fit the research context. For example, instead of stating ‘the policy’ or ‘professionals’, the 
researcher can rephrase these items using the specific policy and group of professionals which are 
being examined, here ‘the DRG policy’ and ‘healthcare professionals’ replaced the template terms. 
This makes it easier for professionals to understand items, as they are better tailored to their context 
and this, in turn, increases reliability and content validity (DeVellis, 2003:62). The items of all 
measures are shown in the Appendix. 
Discretion 
Discretion concerns the perceived freedom of the implementer in terms of the type, quantity and 
quality of sanctions and rewards delivered (Lipsky, 1980). The scale is based on the validated 
measurement instrument of policy alienation (Tummers, 2012). It concerns the dimensions 
‘operational powerlessness’. Sample items were for instance “When I work with the policy, I have to 
adhere to tight procedures” (R) and “While working with the policy, I can make my own judgments”. In 
total, three items were used, as this proved to work best in the confirmatory factor analysis (see 
Section 4). The Cronbach alpha was .78. 
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Client meaningfulness. 
Client meaningfulness (or meaninglessness) was also conceptualized as a dimension of policy 
alienation (Tummers, 2012). It refers to the perception of professionals about the benefits of them 
implementing the DRG policy for their own clients. For instance, do they perceive that they are really 
helping their patients by implementing this policy? Three items were used. Sample items were: “The 
policy is contributing to the welfare of my clients” and “With the policy I can better solve the problems 
of my clients”. The scale’s alpha was .77. 
 
Willingness to implement 
In order to measure willingness to implement, we used the validated scale of Metselaar (1997). Four 
items were used. Sample items are: “I am willing to contribute to the introduction of the policy” and “I 
am willing to free up time to implement the policy”. The scale’s Cronbach’s alpha was .83 in this study. 
Control variables 
We included commonly used individual characteristics: gender, age and whether the respondent 
occupies a management position (yes/no). We also distinguish between psychiatrists and others, 
because the former belong to the medical profession, while the latter (psychologists and 
psychotherapists) are non-medical professionals, which could influence their perceptions. 
3.4 Statistical methods used 
In order to empirically study the theoretical framework of the effects of discretion, we used 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), followed by Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). Although SEM 
CFA and SEM are used in psychology research, these techniques are quite novel to most public 
administration scholars (but see Wright et al., 2012; Yang, 2005). We therefore discuss a number of 
their characteristics in detail.  
 Confirmatory factor analysis is a technique for testing the factor structure of latent constructs, 
based on theory and prior research experience. In our case, this is appropriate, given that prior 
analyses have already explored the variables discretion and client meaningfulness (Tummers, 2012) 
and willingness to implement (Metselaar, 1997).  CFA has several advantages over exploratory factor 
analysis, such as far more stringent psychometric criteria for accepting models, thereby improving 
validity and reliability (Brown, 2006). 
 Using CFA, a measurement model is specified. The measurement model specifies the number 
of factors and shows how the indicators (items) relate to the various factors (Brown, 2006:51). Hence, 
it shows for instance how the items asked to measure discretion relate to the latent construct of 
discretion. This measurement model is used as a precursor for the SEM-analysis. In the SEM-
analysis, a structural model is constructed. This structural model shows how the various latent factors 
are related to each other. For instance, it shows how discretion is related to willingness to implement. 
An advantage over regression analyses is that in the SEM-analyses, a total model can be tested 
where variables can be both dependent and independent. As the variable client meaningfulness is 
  12 
both dependent (it is hypothesized to be influenced by discretion) and independent (it is hypothesized 
to influence willingness to implement), this was appropriate for our model. For mediation models (as is 
our model), SEM is preferred over regression analysis (Iacobucci et al., 2007). In order to test the total 
model, fit indices are used (see results).  
 The analyses are done using the latent variable program Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-
2010). In contrast to SPSS it can handle CFA and SEM analyses. Mplus is well-suited for handling 
non-normally distributed data (which is often the case when employing surveys), while both SPSS and 
AMOS have limited capabilities in this respect. As our data were (mildly) non-normally distributed, this 
was an advantage. We used Robust Maximum Likelihood, an estimator which works very well in these 
circumstances (Brown, 2006:379). However, a drawback from Mplus is that the researcher requires 
knowledge of syntax. 
3.5 Measurement model 
Before analyzing the structural model, we will firstly analyze the measurement model. As the structural 
model can be seen as the results of the analyses, this is shown in Section 4 (Results). 
 Based on the results of the measurement model, a number of modifications were made in 
order to improve the model. The only modifications were that a number of items for the latent factors 
were deleted (three for discretion, one for client meaningfulness, one for willingness to implement). 
This was based on theoretical grounds (fit of item content with definition of concept/latent factor) and 
the minimization of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). This fit index can be used to compare 
competing models. As suggested by other scholars, selected the model with the lowest AIC, thereby 
taking into account theoretically plausibility (Schreiber et al., 2006). 
 Several authors suggest to report RMSEA, TLI and CFI when describing model fit (Schreiber 
et al., 2006; van de Schoot et al., 2012). The Root Mean Square Error Of Approximation (RMSEA) – a 
widely recommended fit index which tests the absolute fit of the model – was .048. This indicates good 
fit, as Hu and Bentler (1999) suggest that values ≤ .06 indicate good fit (<.08 average fit). The Tucker-
Lewis Index (TLI) is a comparative fit index that compares the fit of the model with the baseline model. 
The TLI in our study was .98, which is considered excellent (≥ .90, better ≥ .95). The Comparative Fit 
Index is also a comparative fit index and was .98 in our final model, which shows good fit (≥ .90, better 
≥ .95). 
 In our final model, each item loaded significantly on its appropriate latent variable. For 
instance, an item to tap discretion loaded onto the variable discretion. The values of the standardized 
factor loadings were all relatively high (min. .51, max. .91, average .75) . This shows evidence of 
convergent validity: items which tap the same latent construct are related to each other (Kline, 2010).  
 Before going to the results, we should discuss the possibility of common method variance. 
Self-reported data based on a single application of a questionnaire can result in inflated relationships 
between variables due to common method variance, i.e. variance that is due to the measurement 
method rather than the constructs themselves (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). Although a recent study 
showed that “in contrast to conventional wisdom, common method effects do not appear to be so large 
as to pose a serious threat to organizational research” (Lance et al., 2010:450), we conducted a test to 
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analyse whether common method bias was a major concern here. We compared the three-factor 
structure (discretion, client meaningfulness and willingness to implement) with a one-factor model. The 
fit indices show that the one-factor model had a much poorer fit than the three factor model. The AIC 
was higher, and the RMSEA (.16), CFI (.58) and TLI (.54) indicated much poorer fit. Hence, common 
method variance does not seem to be a major problem here. 
 
4 Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows the means, standard deviations and correlations for the variables. A number of 
interesting results can be seen. First, many street-level bureaucrats are psychiatrists (42%), and these 
often occupy management positions. Next, the average score on discretion is low, meaning that the 
street-level bureaucrats do not feel that they have a lot of autonomy. This is also the case for 
willingness to implement (2.35) and even stronger for client meaningfulness (1.87). Furthermore, we 
see that, all bivariate correlations for the variables linked through our hypotheses were statistically 
significant and in the anticipated direction. For example, willingness to implement was positively 
related to discretion. 
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables in the study 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Gender .64 NA 1       
2. Age 47.94 11.01 -.34 1      
3. Psychiatrist .42 NA -.28 .22 1     
4. Managing 
position 
.44 NA -.26 .19 .39 1    
5. Discretion 2.80 .90 NS NS -.10 -.12 1   
6. Client 
meaningful-
ness 
1.87 .72 .13 -.13 -.13 NS .28 1  
7. Willingness to 
implement 
2.35 .79 .15 -.15 -.15 NS .35 .50 1 
Note: NA = Not applicable (standard deviations are not applicable to dummy variables). NS = Not significant. All 
shown correlation scores are significant at p < .01 
4.2 Structural model 
The central goal of this article is to understand the mechanisms at work in the relationship between 
discretion, client meaningfulness and willingness to implement. The resulting structural equation model 
is shown in Figure 2. Table 2 shows the specific results of the empirical results, including control 
variables.  
 First, an effect of discretion on client meaningfulness was found (standardized coefficient .33, 
p<.01). This means that when a psychologists, psychotherapists or psychiatrists felt that he/she had 
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sufficient discretion when implementing the DRG-policy, they also felt that they could better help their 
patients, tailoring the needs of the patients to the contents of the policy. Hence, we do not reject 
Hypothesis 1. Next to this, the empirical tests show an cascading effect from discretion to willingness 
to implement through the mediating variable client meaningfulness. As noted, the effect (standardized 
coefficient) of discretion on client meaningfulness was .33 (p<.01). Furthermore, the effect from client 
meaningfulness on willingness to implement was .49 (p<.01), meaning that when a street-level 
bureaucrat felt that the policy was meaningful for their clients, they indeed felt more willing to 
implement it. The total indirect effect was hence .16 (33*.49, p<.01). Given that this effect is significant 
and positive, we do not reject hypothesis 2. Furthermore, the direct effect of discretion on willingness 
to implement was also significant (β=.27, p<.01), thus not rejecting hypothesis 3. The total effect of 
discretion on willingness to implement is the sum of its direct and indirect effects: .27+.16=.43. This 
means that – all other things being equal – that when the perceived discretion of the street-level 
bureaucrat increases by 1, the willingness to implement increases by .43 (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Zhao 
et al., 2010). As there is both a direct and an indirect significant effect, there is evidence of partial 
mediation, which was also hypothesized. This (partially mediated) model proved to be a very good fit 
of the data: RMSEA = .04 (criterion ≤ .08), CFI = .97 (criterion ≥ .90), TLI = .96 (criterion ≥ .90).  
 To shed more light on the mediating mechanisms, we conducted additional SEM analyses to 
test the validity of two alternative models: a model without mediation and a model with full mediation. 
The model without mediation did not fit as adequately as the partially mediated model, given that the 
AIC was far higher compared to the partially mediated model. The fully mediated model also had a 
higher AIC, although the differences are small.  
 Furthermore, we used bootstrapping in order to test the indirect effect of discretion on 
willingness to implement via client meaningfulness. Bootstrapping is the preferred method for testing 
mediated effects (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Zhao et al., 2010). It presents estimates and confidence 
intervals so that we can test the significance of the mediation effect. The 99% confidence interval for 
the standardized indirect effect (which was .16) is between .11 and .22, which means that we can be 
for 99% certain that the indirect effect is not equal to (or lower than) 0.
1
 Hence, it seems that a positive 
mediation effect is clearly present in our sample. 
 Given these results, we do not reject hypothesis 1-3. In the discussion and conclusion, we 
discuss the implications of this for both theory and practice. 
  
                                                     
1
 Bootstrap 5000 times, Maximum Likelihood estimation is used as Robust Maximum Likelihood is not 
available for bootstrapping. 
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Figure 2 Structural equation model for relationships between discretion, client meaningfulness and willingness to 
implement (control variables not shown) 
 
 
 
Table 2 Results From Structural Equation Modeling 
Model Meaningfulness 
for clients 
(standardized 
scores) 
Meaningfulness 
for clients 
(unstandardized 
scores) 
Willingness to 
implement 
(standardized 
scores) 
Willingness to 
implement 
(unstandardized 
scores) 
     
Control variables     
Gender NS NS NS NS 
Age -.092 -.006 NS NS 
Managing position NS NS .144 0.212 
Psychiatrist NS NS NS NS 
     
Direct influences     
Discretion .330 .334 .268 0.302 
Meaningfulness for clients - - .524 0.527 
     
Indirect influence     
Discretion via 
meaningfulness for clients 
- - .162 0.176 
     
R
2
 0.135 - 0.446 - 
Note: NS = Not significant. All shown correlation scores are significant at p < .01 
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5 Conclusion 
How and why does discretion of street level bureaucrats influence the willingness to implement 
specific policy programs  and what role does client meaningfulness play in it? This was the general 
research question which laid behind this article. Our research shows that the discretion of street-level 
bureaucrats does influence the willingness to implement in two ways. First, we see that discretion 
influences client meaningfulness, because street-level bureaucrats are more able to tailor their 
decisions and  the procedures they have to follow to the specific situations and needs of their clients. 
In doing so, discretion gives street level bureaucrats the possibility to apply their own judgments when 
dealing with the needs and wishes of citizens. When street-level bureaucrats feel relatively free in their 
implementing of the policy, they are better able to contribute to the welfare of its clients, dealing with 
the problems that his or her clients have in a more satisfying way.  
 At the same time, the positive effect that discretion has on the bureaucrat’s perception of client 
meaningfulness can be seen as important condition for a willingness to implement the policy, as this 
effect is mediated through client meaningfulness. The research shows that when street-level 
bureaucrats perceive that their work is meaningful to his/her clients, they are also more willing to 
implement a specific policy program, because they are more convinced of the goals and benefits of 
this program. Hence, we provided additional empirical evidence for the notion that street-level 
bureaucrats want to make a difference to their clients’ lives when implementing a policy, and when 
they feel that they cannot do this, this may lead them to resist the policy (see also May & Winter, 2009; 
Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003). However, our research does also another  effect, more 
autonomous effect.  Discretion seems to be inherently valued by street-level bureaucrats, thereby 
directly influencing their willingness to implement a specific policy program. This is in line with the 
literature from the HRM, where leading authors note that autonomy is an intrinsic need for people. One 
of the central tenets of this movement is that employees have a right to make input into decisions that 
affect their lives (Deci & Ryan, 2004; McGregor, 1960; Wagner III, 1994). Given these outcomes we 
can state that discretion influences the effectiveness and legitimacy of public policy programs in a 
positive way, because discretion stimulates willingness and reduces resistance. 
 This has interesting implications for the theory and practice of policy implementation. From a 
theoretical point of view it contributes to this long lasting discussion about the validity of a more top 
down and bottom-up perspective on policy implementation. Discretion seems to have a positive effect 
on the effectiveness of policy programs, thereby reducing resistance, while at the same time it adds to 
the legitimacy of the policy implementation process, because it able to meet the needs and wishes of 
citizens in a more appropriate way (in this eyes of the implementing bureaucrats).  Moreover, the 
theoretical implications of our findings are also related to the empirical basis of our research, given 
large sample that is used (1,317 respondents out of 5, 199 respondents that were approached). If we 
compare this to empirical base of the predominantly qualitative and a small number of case studies 
that have been carried when studying the effects of discretion, then the empirical validity of our 
findings add substantially to earlier mentioned top down/bottom up discussion. 
 For the practice of public administration, it seems important, when drafting policy program, it is 
important to give the implementing street-level bureaucrats some freedom to adjust the policy program 
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in order to be effective and legitimate. Here, we note that the degree of discretion felt can vary within 
the same policy, as among else as a result of specific organizational rules and preferences, 
managerial performance and risk management and personality characteristics of the street-level 
bureaucrat (Brehm & Hamilton, 1996; Eaton Baier et al., 1986; Lipsky, 1984; Prottas, 1979). Hence, 
the study results for instance have important consequences for the role of performance management 
and risk management in the implementation of these programs, because the central role that detailed 
performance indicators and risk reduction rules play in the implementation process very often leads to 
a broad variety of rather detailed norms and guidelines that have to be obeyed by the involved street 
level bureaucrats. Concluding, our empirical results show that care should be taken when reducing the 
autonomy of the street-level bureaucrats implementing the policy.  We are not saying that 
policymakers and managers should never reduce discretion: discretion can have substantial 
downsides, such as empire building and inefficiency (Deakin, 1994; Lipsky, 1980). Rather, we are 
warning that diminishing the discretion of street-level bureaucrats should be a deliberate, informed 
choice, made after balancing the possible advantages and disadvantages in the specific situation. 
 This brings us to the limitations of this study. As with all studies, this study has limitations. One 
important limitation is case we analyzed: psychologists, psychotherapists and psychiatrists working in 
(semi)public organizations and implementing the governmental policy DRGs. One the one hand this 
addresses a group of street-level bureaucrats that have not studied intensively in the discretion 
literature; on the other hand it is rather specific group of highly trained professionals which traditionally, 
due to their professional training, have gained a lot of professional autonomy. Moreover, the 
psychologists and psychiatrist that were approached, although they perform a vital role in 
implementing a specific policy program, work outside traditional government organizations (such as 
municipalities). Hence, it would be interesting to compare the results of this study with a similar study 
that addresses other groups of street-level bureaucrats who have received other types of professional 
training or who are a part of government service bureaucracy. A second limitation is that we have only 
examine two, positive, effects of discretion: client meaningfulness and willingness to implement. 
Hence, we were primarily looking at perceived positive effects of discretion, and therefore largely 
ignored its negative side. In future studies, scholars could take into account numerous (negative and 
positive) effects, thereby developing a more all-encompassing model considering the possible effects 
of discretion. 
 Concluding, this study develops a theoretical framework regarding two important effects of 
discretion (client meaningfulness and willingness to implement). The results firstly show a positive 
effect of discretion on client meaningfulness. Next to this, discretion positively affected the willingness 
to implement a policy, and this is partially mediated by client meaningfulness. Hence, when street-level 
bureaucrats experience discretion, this positively influences the value they can deliver to clients, which 
in turn positively influences their willingness to implement a policy. 
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Measures 
Appendix: Items used for scales 
Discretion (based on Tummers, 2012)  
1. When I work with the policy, I have to adhere to tight procedures (R) 
2. While working with the policy, I cannot sufficiently tailor it to the needs of my clients (R) 
3. While working with the policy, I can make my own judgments 
 
Client meaningfulness (based on Tummers, 2012) 
1. The policy is harmful for my clients privacy (R) 
2. With the policy I can better solve the problems of my clients 
3. The policy is contributing to the welfare of my clients 
 
Willingness to implement (based on Metselaar, 1997) 
1. I intend to try to convince employees of the benefits the policy will bring 
2. I intend to put effort into achieving the goals of the policy 
3. I intend to reduce resistance among employees regarding the policy 
4. I intend to make time to implement the policy 
 
  
  19 
References  
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator–mediator variable distinction in social 
psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 51(6), 1173-1182.  
Barrett, S., & Fudge, C. (1981). Policy and action. New York: Methuen.  
Berkman, M., & Plutzer, E. (2010). Evolution, creationism, and the battle to control america's 
classrooms. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Press.  
Brehm, J., & Gates, S. (1999). Working, shirking, and sabotage: Bureaucratic response to a 
democratic public. Michigan: University of Michigan Press.  
Brehm, J., & Hamilton, J. T. (1996). Noncompliance in environmental reporting: Are violators ignorant, 
or evasive, of the law? American Journal of Political Science, , 444-477.  
Brodkin, E. Z., & Majmundar, M. (2010). Administrative exclusion: Organizations and the hidden costs 
of welfare claiming. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 20(4), 827-848.  
Brown, T. A. (2006). Confirmatory factor analysis for applied research. London: The Guilford Press.  
Dahl, R. A. (1989). Democracy and its critics. New Haven: Yale University Press.  
Davis, K. C. (1969). Discretionary justice: A preliminary inquiry. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State 
University Press.  
Deakin, N. (1994). The politics of welfare: Continuities and change. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.  
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2004). Handbook of self-determination research. Rochester: Univ of 
Rochester Pr.  
DeHart-Davis, L., & Pandey, S. (2005). Red tape and public employees: Does perceived rule 
dysfunction alienate managers? Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 15(1), 
133-148.  
DeLeon, P., & DeLeon, L. (2002). What ever happened to policy implementation? an alternative 
approach. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 12(4), 467.  
DeVellis, R. F. (2003). Scale development: Theory and applications. Thousand Oaks: Sage.  
Eaton Baier, V., March, J. G., & Saetren, H. (1986). Implementation and ambiguity. Scandinavian 
Journal of Management Studies, 2(3-4), 197-212.  
Eilam, G., & Shamir, B. (2005). Organizational change and self-concept threats. The Journal of 
Applied Behavioral Science, 41(4), 399-421.  
Elmore, R. F. (1985). Forward and backward mapping: Reversible logics in the analysis of public 
policy. In K. Hanf, & T. A. J. Toonen (Eds.), Policy implementation in federal and unitary systems: 
Questions of analysis and design (pp. 33-70). Dordrecht: Nijhoff.  
Evans, T. (2010). Professional discretion in welfare services: Beyond street-level bureaucracy. 
London: Ashgate.  
Ewalt, J. A. G., & Jennings, E. T. (2004). Administration, governance, and policy tools in welfare policy 
implementation. Public Administration Review, 64(4), 449-462.  
Freidson, E. (2001). Professionalism: The third logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Goggin, M. L., Bowman, A. O. M., Lester, J. P., & O'Toole, L. (1990). Implementation theory and 
practice: Toward a third generation. New York: Harper Collins.  
  20 
Hanf, K. (1982). Regulatory structures: Enforcement as implementation. European Journal of Political 
Research, 10(2), 159-172.  
Hill, M., & Hupe, P. (2009). Implementing public policy (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks: Sage.  
Hjern, B., & Hull, C. (1982). Implementation research as empirical constitutionalism. European Journal 
of Political Research, 10(2), 105-115.  
Hogwood, B., & Gunn, L. (1984). Policy analysis for the real world. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Hood, C. (1991). A public management for all seasons. Public Administration, 19(1), 3-19.  
Hu, L., & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure analysis: 
Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary 
Journal, 6(1), 1-55.  
Iacobucci, D., Saldanha, N., & Deng, X. (2007). A meditation on mediation: Evidence that structural 
equations models perform better than regressions. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 17(2), 140-
154.  
Kimberly, J. R., De Pouvourville, G., & Thomas, A. D. A. (2009). The globalization of managerial 
innovation in health care. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Kline, R. B. (2010). Principles and practice of structural equation modeling. London: The Guilford 
Press.  
Lance, C. E., Dawson, B., Birkelbach, D., & Hoffman, B. J. (2010). Method effects, measurement 
error, and substantive conclusions. Organizational Research Methods, 13(3), 435-455.  
Lewin, K. (1936). Principles of topological psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill.  
Lipsky, M. (1980). Street-level bureaucracy. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.  
Lipsky, M. (1984). Bureaucratic disentitlement in social welfare programs. The Social Service Review, 
58(1), 3-27.  
Lowi, T. J. (1993). Legitimizing public administration: A disturbed dissent. Public Administration 
Review, 53(3), 261-264.  
May, P. J., & Winter, S. C. (2009). Politicians, managers, and street-level bureaucrats: Influences on 
policy implementation. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 19(3), 453.  
Maynard-Moody, S., & Musheno, M. (2000). State agent or citizen agent: Two narratives of discretion. 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 10(2), 329.  
Maynard-Moody, S., & Musheno, M. C. (2003). Cops, teachers, counselors: Stories from the front lines 
of public service. University of Michigan: University of Michigan Press.  
McGregor, D. (1960). The human side of enterprise. New York: Wiley.  
Meier, K. J., & O'Toole, L. J. (2002). Public management and organizational performance: The effect 
of managerial quality. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 21(4), 629-643.  
Merton, R. K. (1995). The thomas theorem and the matthew effect. Social Forces, 74(2), 379-422.  
Metselaar, E. E. (1997). Assessing the willingness to change: Construction and validation of the 
DINAMO. (Doctoral dissertation, Free University of Amsterdam).  
Meyers, M. K., & Vorsanger, S. (2003). Street-level bureaucrats and the implementation of public 
policy. In B. Guy Peters, & J. Pierre (Eds.), Handbook of public administration (pp. 245–254). 
London: Sage.  
  21 
Muthén, L., & Muthén, B. (1998-2010). Mplus user's guide (Sixth ed.). Los Angeles, CA: Muthén & 
Muthén.  
Oosterwaal, A., Payne, D., & Torenvlied, R. (2011). The effect of political disagreement on discretion: 
Mechanisms and conditions. Administration & Society, , 1-25.  
O'Toole, L. J. (2000). Research on policy implementation: Assessment and prospects. Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory, 10(2), 263-288.  
Palm, I., Leffers, F., Emons, T., Van Egmond, V., & Zeegers, S. (2008). De GGz ontwricht: Een 
praktijkonderzoek naar de gevolgen van het nieuwe zorgstelsel in de geestelijke 
gezondheidszorg. Den Haag: SP.  
Palumbo, D. J., Maynard-Moody, S., & Wright, P. (1984). Measuring degrees of successful 
implementation. Evaluation Review, 8(1), 45-74.  
Piderit, S. K. (2000). Rethinking resistance and recognizing ambivalence: A multidimensional view of 
attitudes toward an organizational change. The Academy of Management Review, 25(4), 783-
794.  
Podsakoff, P. M., & Organ, D. W. (1986). Self-reports in organizational research: Problems and 
prospects. Journal of Management, 12(4), 531-544.  
Polsky, A. J. (1993). The rise of the therapeutic state. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2004). SPSS and SAS procedures for estimating indirect effects in 
simple mediation models. Behavior Research Methods, 36(4), 717-731.  
Pressman, J., & Wildavsky, A. (1984). Implementation (3rd ed.). Berkeley, CA: University of California 
press.  
Prottas, J. M. (1979). People processing: The street-level bureaucrat in public service bureaucracies. 
Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.  
Riccucci, N. M. (2005a). How management matters: Street-level bureaucrats and welfare reform. 
Georgetown: Georgetown University Press.  
Riccucci, N. M. (2005b). Street-level bureaucrats and intrastate variation in the implementation of 
temporary assistance for needy families policies. Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory, 15(1), 89-111.  
Rist, R. C. (1995). Policy evaluation, linking theory to practice. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.  
Sabatier, P. A., & Jenkins-Smith, H. C. (1993). Policy change and learning: An advocacy coalition 
approach. Boulder: Westview Press.  
Sabatier, P. A., & Mazmanien, D. (1979). The conditions for effective implementation. Policy Analysis, 
5 (Fall), 481-504.  
Saetren, H. (2005). Facts and myths about research on public policy implementation: Out‐of‐Fashion, 
allegedly dead, but still very much alive and relevant. Policy Studies Journal, 33(4), 559-582.  
Schreiber, J. B., Nora, A., Stage, F. K., Barlow, E. A., & King, J. (2006). Reporting structural equation 
modeling and confirmatory factor analysis results: A review. The Journal of Educational 
Research, 99(6), 323-338.  
Simon, W. H. (1987). Ethical discretion in lawyering. Harvard Law Review, 101(6), 1083.  
  22 
Thomson, R., Torenvlied, R., & Arregui, J. (2007). The paradox of compliance: Infringements and 
delays in transposing european union directives. British Journal of Political Science, 37(4), 685-
709.  
Tummers, L. G. (2011). Explaining the willingness of public professionals to implement new policies: A 
policy alienation framework. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 77(3), 555-581.  
Tummers, L. G. (2012). Policy alienation of public professionals: The construct and its measurement. 
Public Administration Review, 72(4), 516-525.  
Tummers, L. G., Bekkers, V. J. J. M., & Steijn, A. J. (2009). Policy alienation of public professionals: 
Application in a new public management context. Public Management Review, 11(5), 685-706.  
Tummers, L. G., Steijn, A. J., & Bekkers, V. J. J. M. (forthcoming 2012). Explaining willingness of 
public professionals to implement public policies: Content, context, and personality 
characteristics. Public Administration,  
van de Schoot, R., Lugtig, P., & Hox, J. (2012). A checklist for testing measurement invariance.  
Van Meter, D. S., & Van Horn, C. E. (1975). The policy implementation process: A conceptual 
framework. Administration & Society, 6(4), 445-488.  
Van Sambeek, N., Tonkens, E., & Bröer, C. (2011). Sluipend kwaliteitsverlies in de geestelijke 
gezondheidszorg. B En M : Tijdschrift Voor Politiek, Beleid En Maatschappij, 38(March), 47-64.  
Vinzant, J. C., Denhardt, J. V., & Crothers, L. (1998). Street-level leadership: Discretion and legitimacy 
in front-line public service. Washington: Georgetown University Press.  
Wagner III, J. A. (1994). Participation's effects on performance and satisfaction: A reconsideration of 
research evidence. Academy of Management Review, 19(2), 312-330.  
Winter, S. C. (2003). Implementation: Introduction. In B. Guy Peters, & J. Pierre (Eds.), Handbook of 
public administration (pp. 205-211). London: Sage.  
Winter, S. C. (2007). Implementation perspectives, status and reconsideration. In B. Guy Peters, & J. 
Pierre (Eds.), The handbook of public administration. concise paperback edition (pp. 131-141). 
New York: Sage.  
Wright, B. E., Moynihan, D. P., & Pandey, S. K. (2012). Pulling the levers: Transformational 
leadership, public service motivation, and mission valence. Public Administration Review, 72(2), 
206-215.  
Yang, K. (2005). Public administrators' trust in citizens: A missing link in citizen involvement efforts. 
Public Administration Review, 65(3), 273-285.  
Zhao, X., Lynch, J. G., & Chen, Q. (2010). Reconsidering baron and kenny: Myths and truths about 
mediation analysis. Journal of Consumer Research, 37(2), 197-206.  
 
